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THE LEGAL BATTLE TO DEFINE THE LAW ON
TRANSNATIONAL ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
EYAL BENVENISTI*
INTRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF PERSISTENT
AND PREVALENT ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon. From the dawn of
history, adversaries developed capabilities to overwhelm their opponents
and conquer them into submission. The technological innovations of the
day, from gun powder and the napalm bomb to unmanned fighting systems,
were the most noticeable form to gain asymmetric power. But technology
also helped the weaker side that resorted to guerilla warfare or terrorism.
The spread of innovations like hand-held missiles, undetectable explosives,
and increasingly improving communication tools offered loosely-organized
insurgents affordable and effective means of confronting mighty
opponents. “[T]he democratization or privatization of the means of
destruction”1 provided novel opportunities for non-state actors to challenge
not only their own governments but also the strongest of powers.
The contemporary democratic spread of technological innovations
ensures the persistence and the prevalence of asymmetric military conflict
between regular armies and irregular, sub-state militias. The powerful side
is drawn into such conflicts relying on increasingly more sophisticated and
accurate, and hence more potent and discerning, weapons that promise a
short and decisive submission of a loosely-organized enemy, with reduced
self-risk and fewer civilian casualties. The stronger party is determined to
end an indefinite state of insecurity caused by a handful of individuals
whose access to an increasingly diverse and lethal arsenal of weapons
threatens national interests. It is politically difficult for both sides to seek
amicable avenues to resolve their conflict: the strong side because it
regards the irregulars as extortionists and the weak side because it must
cultivate an uncompromising maximalist ideology among its fighters. And
* Anny and Paul Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights, Tel Aviv University, Global Visiting
Professor, New York University School of Law. I thank Ziv Bohrer, Shai Dothan, Georg Nolte, and
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1. ERIC HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991, 560 (Vintage
Books 1994).
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as asymmetric battles continue indefinitely, their very persistence is likely
to be regarded as a successful strategy from the perspective of weak or
relatively weak actors. Hence, such conflicts become prevalent: states in
conflict situations whose military capacity is relatively weak tend to adopt
the strategies of the non-state militias, by supporting such groups as proxies
or by turning their own forces into guerilla or terrorist units. This
phenomenon can be observed in the Middle East, with Iraqi forces
reverting to guerrilla tactics during the 2003 invasion, and Syria and Iran
supporting the Hezbollah in Lebanon.2 We can therefore anticipate that
most future wars will be characterized as asymmetric, involving powerful
regular armies and irregular non-state militias.
The rise of transnational asymmetric conflict and the unique
challenges it poses led Toni Pfanner to argue that, if “wars between States
are on the way out, perhaps the norms of international law that were
devised for them are becoming obsolete as well.”3 This essay is a modest
attempt to explore the possible avenues for responding to this challenge.
The regulatory potential of the jus in bello lay in the types of wars
anticipated in Europe during the nineteenth century, and in the common
European effort to maintain the prevailing balance of power. These were
conventional military conflicts between state armies that operated under
similar principles using similar means of warfare. The law consisted of
norms to which the parties consented and which reflected their shared
concerns—the safeguarding of non-combatants and the elimination of
unnecessary suffering of combatants. The law was created by mutual
agreement and enforced through the promise and threat of reciprocity.
Because the law depended on reciprocity not only for consent but also for
enforcement, it applied to aggressors and defenders alike; otherwise, the
aggressor would have no incentive to respect the law during fighting.
In fact, the disjunction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello
indicates that the traditional law was carefully designed to align the
incentives of the parties to the conflict, making sure they all had strong
incentives to obey the law. But the regulation of asymmetric warfare
requires a different structure of incentives to have any effect on the parties.4
In the typical asymmetric war of the past—an internal conflict between a
2. Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and
Humanitarian Action, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 149, 153 (2005); ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, IRAN’S SUPPORT OF THE HEZBOLLAH IN LEBANON 2 (2006).
3. Pfanner, supra note 2, at 158. On the need to take caution in introducing changes into the laws
of war to address non-state actors see Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106
MICH. L. REV. 443 (2007).
4. See Marco Sassòli, The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and
Inherent Challenges, 10 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 45, 57-67 (2007).
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government and local insurgents—neither side had incentives to comply
with but the very minimal restraints. The Additional Protocol II attempted
to strengthen the commitments of parties to internal armed conflict in order
to resuscitate reciprocity5 but, as we know, this effort utterly failed as both
sides to such conflicts eschewed reciprocity in their fighting. A new
paradigm based on an alternative incentive structure of third party
enforcement and adjudication was therefore required. The advent of several
international and hybrid criminal tribunals set up to address intra-state
wars, as well as other regional and international institutions that monitored
compliance with human rights law promised to resolve the crisis of
reciprocity. These institutions and the law that they created6 and enforced
enjoyed the support of powerful countries that wanted to limit violence and
prevent spillover effects from internal warfare affecting neighboring
countries. Now governments involved in intra-state armed conflicts had to
reckon not only with law enforcement by such third parties, but also with
their law-making functions.
But these developments were confined to intra-state asymmetric
conflicts in places like the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Chechnya.
Concurrently with the successful efforts to impose restraints on intra-state
asymmetric warfare, we have been witnessing efforts by the same powerful
countries that pressed for intra-state conflict regulation to deregulate interstate asymmetric warfare, or what may be called “transnational” warfare;
namely, armed conflicts between state military forces and foreign non-state
actors that take place beyond state borders. The formal legal explanations
for deregulating such conflicts suggested that such transnational conflicts
were not internal armed conflicts, because they took place across
international borders, but at the same time they were also not international
armed conflicts because they did not involve two or more nations fighting
each other. Such conflicts were therefore conducted in a legal void, and
hence were subject to only the very basic constraints of Article 3 common
to all four Geneva conventions of 1949.7 Beyond this technical argument,
5. Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II stipulates that it would apply in internal armed conflict
provided, inter alia that the non-state actors “exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of
victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609,
611.
6. On the law-making function of such tribunals see Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make
Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 41
(2006).
7. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27) (holding
that Common Article 3 is “a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also
to apply to international conflicts”); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006)
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there is also a substantive one: because regular armies fight against
irregulars who not only disregard the law but also abuse its protections, the
regular armies should not be expected to comply with the law unilaterally.
These arguments that seek to deny the applicability of legal restraints
to transnational conflicts are challenged by an alternative vision, one that
bears in mind the goal of protecting non-combatants: regular armies that
enjoy significantly more resources and military might than their irregular
enemy must take additional precautions and assume more limitations on
their exercise of power than required in conventional warfare, simply
because of the asymmetric power relations. As discussed below, this
alternative vision already finds support in judgments of national and
international courts, and is reflected in the positions of the ICRC and other
non-state actors.
This essay seeks to explore this tension between the two conflicting
visions on the regulation of transnational armed conflict. Part I outlines the
normative and institutional challenges for the legal regulation of
transnational armed conflict. Part II describes the emerging legal
battleground between states engaged in transnational armed conflict and
third parties—courts, international institutions, NGOs, and civil society—
in developing and enforcing the law and highlights some of the issues that
are at stake.
I. CHALLENGES FOR THE REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT
The regulation of transnational armed conflict poses both normative
and institutional challenges. The normative challenges stem from the fact
that the traditional jus in bello is not sensitive to the power relations
between adversaries in asymmetric conflicts and creates perverse
incentives for parties. The first normative challenge is posed by the
assumption of equality of arms, an unrealistic assumption in most
transnational armed conflicts. The laws of war inherently favor the stronger
army which is capable of striking the military assets of its weaker
adversary, while the adversary is unable to reciprocate in kind. The weaker
party is expected to play by the rules that predetermine its defeat. The
burden of obeying the law rests on the shoulders of the weaker side, who is
likely to find such law morally questionable and certainly not worthy of
compliance, all the more so if—as is often the case—the powerful side
happens to be (or is regarded by the weak opponent as) the aggressor.
(“Common Article 3 . . . affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the
Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory [state] who are
involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of’ a signatory.”).
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The assumption of the equality in arms is maintained despite the fact
that the traditional jus in bello, based on state consent, grants state actors
the power to reject changes in the law that might limit their capabilities.
This is most acutely demonstrated in the regulation of new weaponry.
Usually it is the stronger, technologically advantaged regular army that
develops and enjoys the advantage of using new weapons. That party will
most likely refuse to outlaw new weaponry it holds exclusively. What
Julius Stone observed in 1955 is still true today:
States only come to a common view on regulating or prohibiting new
weapons . . . when no one of them can rely on obtaining or maintaining
the lead in their use. Broadly, therefore, the rules that grow up are rules
touching the old and more marginal weapons, not weapons which by
their novelty and efficiency are more likely to be decisive.8

The weaker party that effectively has no voice in the regulation of new
weaponry and has no access to such weapons sees the law as the dictate of
the strong, designed to ensure its domination.
But the stronger side also has concerns with the traditional norms. Its
non-state adversary fights from within urban centers or otherwise abuses
the protection that the law grants to civilians. The traditional law on
warfare was based on two key premises: that it was possible to isolate
military and civilian targets with sufficient clarity and that there was a
tangible military objective to be attained from the battle, such as hitting
army bases or gaining control over territory. Compliance with the law was
compatible with the interest of armies that sought to focus on military
objectives and offer immunity to uninvolved civilians and enemy
combatants who laid down their arms.9 These premises gave rise to the
expectation that military conflicts could be compatible with humanitarian
ideals—that war would involve inducing concessions from the defeated
party by degrading its military capabilities and weakening and disabling its
fighters without necessarily killing them.10 These premises do not apply
where regular armies fight irregulars. First, in the asymmetric context there
are very few purely military targets. This dramatically limits the ability of a
8. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 551 (Rinehart & Co. 1954).
9. Sassòli, supra note 4, at 58-59 (stating that IHL “make[s] victory easier, because it ensures
that [the combatants] concentrate on what is decisive, the military potential of the enemy”).
10. As the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration asserted, “The only legitimate object which States
should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy . . . for this
purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men.” Declaration Renouncing the
Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29-Dec.11, 1868, 18
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130
?OpenDocument. [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].

BENVENISTI_JCI.DOC

344

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/11/2010 10:53:26 AM

[Vol 20:339

regular army to identify arenas where it can legitimately project its power.
Second, it has become increasingly unclear what can be considered a
military gain, especially since control over enemy resources and territory
often proves to be a liability rather than an asset.
The final challenge to the regulation of transnational conflicts is
institutional. In addition to disagreements over the substantive norms,
parties to asymmetric warfare cannot rely on reciprocity, the longstanding
institution for enforcing compliance with the law. Rather, in asymmetric
situations both parties have strong incentives to violate the law. The weaker
party may resort to perfidy or target non-combatants as perhaps the only
way to harm its opponent. At the same time, the stronger party is not
worried about retaliation. The temptation to strike hard and fast, to respond
disproportionately and to end the conflict swiftly is high, and feelings of
frustration and anger are prevalent when the weaker party perseveres. The
democratic pressure to avoid casualties at all costs also plays out, tempting
the army to impose the collateral damages of combat on the opponent even
at the price of exposing the other side’s civilians to more risk.
The normative concerns of both sides suggest that there is little room
for agreement on mutually accepted norms. Both sides seek to dilute, in
opposite ways, their obligations in this new type of war. The institutional
challenges indicate that parties to transnational conflict cannot rely on
reciprocity to ensure compliance with the law. The conclusion is that the
regulation of transnational conflicts cannot rely on the traditional norms
and institutions of the jus in bello that are designed to address conventional
armed conflicts. Transnational warfare is a very different beast and should
be regulated by different norms and institutions. But what are these new
norms? Which institutions will recognize and implement them?
II. THE POTENTIAL RISE OF NEW LAW AND NEW INSTITUTIONS
FOR REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CONFLICT
Fortunately, technological innovations provide not only new
weaponry but also novel possibilities for monitoring the battlefield.
Monitoring is no longer confined to the parties to the conflict. Information
technology adds a crucial dimension to traditional warfare: it brings the
details of far away conflicts into the homes of people around the world.
The same technology helps convey to governments public opinion
demanding responses to what the public sees as excesses. We thus see a
new logic of enforcement emerging: broader pluralistic dynamics instead of
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the reciprocal relations between the immediate parties to the conflict.11
These dynamics involve various actors including domestic courts, foreign
governments and courts, international organizations and international
tribunals, humanitarian NGOs, and domestic and global civil society. Can
such third parties’ indirect monitoring, lawmaking, and enforcement
functions effectively respond to the challenges of regulating transnational
warfare?
A. Institutional Aspects
New institutions have myriad opportunities to create and enforce the
law. These include formal and informal actors: domestic courts, foreign
national courts, international courts and organizations, foreign
governments, and private firms. NGOs mobilize public opinion to put
pressure on their governments to agree on new constraints in war; third
party governments and even private institutions impose political and
economic pressure on the strong party to a transnational conflict; and
foreign and international courts impose legal sanctions in extreme
situations. These actors participate in the development of new norms and
new types of third-party retaliatory mechanisms ranging from divestment to
criminal prosecutions of those who they find to have violated the law. The
publicly available information about the behavior of the parties to the
transnational conflict raises public attention and enables third party
monitoring. With access to diverse and reliable sources of information,
third parties can monitor, assess, and question the lawfulness of actions
taken by the parties to the conflict. Just as the Battle of Solferino in 1859
inspired Henry Dunant to set up the ICRC, coalitions of NGOs have since
the end of the Cold War managed to set the agenda of legal reform in the
context of the laws of war,12 influencing the adoption of the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997),13 the setting up of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) (1998),14 and the drafting of the
11. Dan Belz, Is International Humanitarian Law Lapsing into Irrelevance in the War on
International Terror?, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97 (2006) (explaining the development of third
party review mechanisms by the erosion of bilateral reciprocity).
12. For the contributions of NGOs to the development of international law see generally Steve
Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (2006);
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 611 (Oxford University Press
2005).
13. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
14. On NGO involvement and achievements see Zoe Pearson, Non-Governmental Organizations
and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 243, 254 (2006); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
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Cluster Munitions Convention (2008).15 As René Provost notes, such
intervention breaks the cartel of government-made law and gives voice to
all stakeholders.16
The very involvement of such third parties in bilateral conflicts is selfenhancing, incrementally strengthening their own legal authority to
intervene in such conflicts rather than remain neutral and aloof. The
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) was particularly innovative in this
context by developing the idea of erga omnes obligations of parties to
armed conflict that create standing to all other states to demand
compliance, and by recognizing the obligation of all state parties to the
Geneva Conventions to ensure that parties to armed conflict comply with
their treaty obligations.17 NGOs, private legal experts, and other non-state
actors have noted the willingness of tribunals to move the law beyond
formal state consent and have embarked on several efforts to generate new
law by adopting soft law “guiding principles” and other such informal
norms that ostensibly interpret the law. These norms practically move the
law beyond state consent and below the radar screens of governments in
the hope that domestic and international courts will resort to them as
reflecting evolving law.18 One such example is the development of the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998, a soft-law instrument
whose main protagonists openly admit was designed “to progressively
develop certain general principles of human rights law where the existing

93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 23 (1999); see generally MARLIES GLASIUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY ACHIEVEMENT (Routledge 2006); MICHAEL J. STRUETT, THE
POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NGOS, DISCOURSE, AND AGENCY
(Macmillan 2008).
15. On NGO involvement see Bonnie Docherty, Breaking New Ground: The Convention on
Cluster Munitions and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 934, 941
(2009); John Borrie, The ‘Long Year’: Emerging International Efforts to Address the Humanitarian
Impacts of Cluster Munitions, 2006-2007, 10 Y.B. INT’L. HUMANITARIAN. L. 251, 259 (2007).
16. René Provost, Asymmetrical Reciprocity and Compliance with the Laws of War 13 (Jan. 14,
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRN_ID1540233_code372725.pdf?abstractid=1427437&mirid=3).
17. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200 (July 9) (“[A]ll the States parties to the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation,
while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with
international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.”)
18. See also Kenneth W. Abbott, Commentary: Privately Generated Soft Law in International
Governance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BRIDGING THEORY AND
PRACTICE 166 (Thomas J. Biersteker et al eds., 2007). Abbott notes that “NGOs and other advocates
often expect privately generated soft law . . . to develop greater normative authority than sovereigntyconscious states and other objectors anticipate, in part by mobilizing and empowering affected groups.”
Id. at 168-69.
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treaties and conventions may contain some gaps.”19 Another such effort is
the reinterpretation of the jus in bellum as obligating offending states to pay
reparations directly to affected individuals rather than to their states.20 In
the latter case, some national courts have responded positively and
recognized such a right,21 and the ICJ has issued an enigmatic statement22
that is sufficient to blow new wind in the sails of soft law entrepreneurs.
Unchained from the shackles of reciprocity, not only have the
modalities of enforcement changed, but the law itself can change and
already has in some contexts. No longer bound by parties’ consent, third
parties, acting separately or collectively, can overcome power disparities
between the parties to the conflict and the contingencies of this new type of
asymmetric combat. The rise of international criminal law cannot be
explained otherwise. Moreover, its applicability to internal armed conflicts
must be attributed to the jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), which has in only a few years
of adjudicating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia virtually rewritten the
law on internal armed conflicts. By formally asserting the laws customary
status, the ICTY overcame years of governmental resistance to regulating
methods for fighting insurgents.23
Strong parties that fight against non-state actors now have new
incentives that are not based on bilateral reciprocity to comply with the
law; for example, to eliminate excessive harm to non-combatants. In fact,
parties to contemporary conflicts engage this new “front” of public
relations and law—what some governments scornfully call “lawfare”—by
developing their own means of “lawfare.” They do so by employing
various information technologies ranging from news briefings to video
clips on YouTube to fill information gaps that they view as detrimental and
control what the world will see.24
19. Walter Kälin, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement – Introduction, 10 INT’L J. OF
REFUGEE L. 557, 561 (1998). See also Francis M. Deng, The Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement and the Development of International Norms, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 141 (Thomas J. Biersteker et al. eds.,
2007); Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: An Innovation in
International Standard Setting, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 459 (2004).
20. See Draft Declaration of International Law Principles on Compensation for Victims of War,
art. 6 (Int’l Law Ass’n 2008). As noted in the Report presented at the ILA Rio de Janiero Conference of
2008, Article 6 proposed that “[v]ictims of armed conflict have a right to full and prompt reparation.”
21. See Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany
Case No. 11/2000, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 198 (2001).
22. 2004 I.C.J. at 138 (noting the obligation to pay compensation without explicitly mentioning
who is directly entitled to compensation).
23. See Danner, supra note 6, at 41.
24. See Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L. L. 409, 424 (2009)
(“Virtual military technologies have been instrumental in making international law relevant to armed
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Thus, the intensified involvement of third parties creates a new
conflict between the conventional armies that fight insurgents or terrorists
and seek more discretion and fewer constraints and the third parties who
insist on maintaining and even increasing constraints in warfare. We might
call it a conflict between the “IHL camp,” that emphasizes the
humanitarian aim of the jus in bello, which they refer to as International
Humanitarian Law, and the “LOAC camp,” that wishes to point out that the
Law of Armed Conflict is primarily designed to regulate the relations
between fighting armies and therefore must take military concerns
seriously into account. The LOAC camp insists that this “lawfare” is not
only hypocritical but also perilous: that the IHL camp is being manipulated
by the terrorists, who endanger the population on whose behalf they
ostensibly fight by their abuse of civilian immunities. In a sense, and
certainly unwillingly, the IHL camp becomes a strategic ally of the
terrorists because the terrorists benefit indirectly from whatever constraints
the IHL camp would impose.
Despite these objections, it is not likely that governments can avoid
accountability for their conduct of hostilities to formal or informal IHL
actors. In an age informed by liberal principles that reject collective
punishment and guilt by association, protecting non-combatants remains a
common concern. Even the domestic courts of those governments that
engage in such conflicts resist the demand to yield authority to the
executive.25 At this stage it is possible to assume that the recourse to third
parties will only intensify and expand. But questions remain as to how this
law would and should look. Among the remaining questions are the extent
to which third parties should second-guess military decisions and how far
they would (and should) develop the law without government consent. The
following sections outline the fundamental dispute as to which direction
developing the law on transnational conflicts should take.
B. Normative Aspects
What would (and what should) be the contours of the new law created
by third parties? Why should it constrain the non-consenting state that
engages in transnational warfare? It is beyond the scope of this essay to
delve into these profound questions. Instead, I will outline the two
opposing approaches that can already be observed. The position of the
LOAC side is that transnational armed conflicts are not, and should not, be
conflicts, in part by bringing new levels of transparency to questions about the legitimacy of military
operations and related notions of what constitutes victory in war.”).
25. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International
Law by National Courts, 102 AM J. INT’L L. 241, 255 (2008).
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regulated by conventional norms; instead, the law should grant parties more
discretion than is afforded in conventional warfare. Conventional armies
engaged in transnational armed conflicts dispute the applicability of the jus
in bello to particular conflicts they engage in, arguing that they do not rise
above the threshold requirements for an “armed conflict” subject to that
law. Technological innovations allow powerful states to resort to effective
acts of war like the targeting of individuals or other types of low intensity
warfare without committing to invasions with ground troops or heavy
bombardments. Conventional armies argue that such acts do not amount to
“protracted armed fighting between organized armed groups,” which is the
threshold for applicability of the law.26 Moreover, the identity of the
irregular enemy, not a party to the relevant treaties or a subject of
international law, has been invoked as another explanation for why such
conflict is not subject to the law.27 According to this view, states can resort
to military means because they are acting in self-defense and are not
constrained by jus in bello as long as they do not reach the level of intensity
of an armed conflict.28
Even when the LOAC camp agrees to abide by the constraints of jus
in bello in transnational armed conflicts, some governments put forward
arguments that call for an expansive definition of military targets29 and
military goals.30 This reasoning taxes the civilian population for the fact
that the irregular force does not distinguish between the military and
26. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004-2009, 1 (Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (“By October of 2009, the CIA had launched around 80 drone
attacks. These attacks cannot be justified under international law for a number of reasons. First drones
launch missiles or drop bombs, the kind of weapons that may only be used lawfully in an armed
conflict. Until the spring of 2009, there was no armed conflict on the territory of Pakistan because there
was no intense armed fighting between organized armed groups. International law does not recognize
the right to kill without warning outside an actual armed conflict.”); see also Jordan J. Paust, SelfDefense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2010).
27. See George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants,
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891, 893 (2002).
28. For this position see Paust, supra note 26, at 22 (“Article 51 self-defense actions provide a
paradigm that is potentially different than either a mere law enforcement or war paradigm, and it is
understood that military force can be used in self-defense when measures are reasonably necessary and
proportionate.”).
29. As Israeli Defence Forces spokesman Captain Benjamin Rutland is reported to have told the
BBC: “Our definition is that anyone who is involved with terrorism within Hamas is a valid target. This
ranges from the strictly military institutions and includes the political institutions that provide the
logistical funding and human resources for the terrorist arm.” Heather Sharp, Gaza Conflict: Who is a
Civilian?, BBC News, Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7811386.stm.
30. Gabriel Siboni, Inst. for Nat’l Security Stud., Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of
Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War, INSIGHT 74 (2008), available at http://www.inss.org.il/
publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2222.
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civilian functions of its apparatus. Hence, civilian targets become military
ones31 and captured civilians may be kept in detention indefinitely as
suspected combatants.
International Humanitarian Law, which is endorsed by foreign actors
and by several national courts, takes the opposite approach and rejects the
concept that armed conflict can take place in a legal void and insists on the
applicability of at least the minimal requirements of the jus in bello.32 The
Israeli Supreme Court in its judgment regarding targeted killings went even
further by stipulating that an international armed conflict exists when a
state conducts armed activities outside its national boundaries.33 While
these views may go beyond the text, and in the latter case beyond
conventional wisdom, they maintain the logic of ensuring the protection of
the foreign civilian population. Ultimately, it is this population which
immediately suffers from any lowering of the standards expected of
combatants.
In general, third party actors, and certainly third party norm
entrepreneurs, suggest that the legal restraints on transnational conflict
must treat the stronger party as responsible for positively protecting the
population in the theater of operation from harm because the stronger party
often exclusively, has effective—even if only virtual—control over the
population.34 In fact, with recourse to new types of weaponry and
reconnaissance tools, with 24/7 presence of unmanned aerial vehicles
(“UAV”) over foreign territory, contemporary armies often have the
capacity to control some of the activities of the population on the ground
effectively as an occupying power. Such control can perhaps be regarded as
31. STATE OF ISRAEL, THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 DEC. 2008-18 JAN. 2009: FACTUAL AND
LEGAL ASPECTS ¶ 235, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/
Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Operation_in_Gaza-Factual_and_Legal_Aspects.htm
(“While Hamas operates ministries and is in charge of a variety of administrative and traditionally
governmental functions in the Gaza Strip, it still remains a terrorist organisation. Many of the ostensibly
civilian elements of its regime are in reality active components of its terrorist and military efforts.
Indeed, Hamas does not separate its civilian and military activities in the manner in which a legitimate
government might. Instead, Hamas uses apparatuses under its control, including quasi-governmental
institutions, to promote its terrorist activity.”).
32. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006).
33. HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel
[2005], available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (stating that the
law on international armed conflicts “applies in any case of an armed conflict of international
character – in other words, one that crosses the borders of the state – whether or not the place in which
the armed conflict occurs is subject to belligerent occupation.”).
34. For more detailed discussion, and endorsement, of this view see Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on
Asymmetric Warfare, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., forthcoming 2010).
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virtual occupation. As the law stands, during conventional international
armed conflict, obligations to occupied populations are more demanding
than those toward foreign civilians in the combat zone.35
This last point requires explanation: in symmetric warfare, the
attacker’s power does not amount to an ability to fully control the lives of
the enemy’s population. The defending government is still in control and in
fact forcefully resists the attacker’s effort to gain exclusivity. Lacking such
exclusive control, there is no basis to impose an obligation on the attacking
army to ensure enemy civilians’ lives (protecting them, for example, from
internal ethnic conflicts). Their army, which is still in control, has the duty
to ensure their rights. Instead, before and during the attack, the attacking
army owes a duty to respect enemy civilians’ lives, consisting of the duty
to avoid unnecessary harm. In contrast, the same army will assume the duty
to ensure the rights of enemy civilians when they become subject to its
effective control as prisoners of war or “protected persons” in occupied
territories.36 An obligation to ensure the civilians’ rights is fundamentally
different from an obligation to respect them, applicable to parties to
symmetric conflicts. The vertical power relations that exist in transnational
asymmetric conflicts, particularly against non-state actors, seem to call for
recognizing positive duties towards those civilians, like in an occupation.
Such a duty will reflect the nature and scope of the power that the
“attacking” army (during an on-going, indefinite “attack”) has over the
attacked population.
The obligation to protect in transnational asymmetric armed conflict,
if recognized, would be quite demanding. It would call for three specific
obligations. First, it would require the consideration of alternatives to
military action and the determination of whether the decision to use force
against legitimate military targets rather than exploring non-forcible, or
less-forcible alternatives, was justified under the circumstances. In fact it
would imply injecting jus ad bellum considerations, or human rights law,
into jus in bello analysis. Secondly, if there were no available alternatives,
a second requirement would demand that the army invest significant
resources to minimize harm to civilians. Finally, the army would be

35. The obligation to “ensure” public order and civil life in occupied territory is recognized by the
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct. 18, 1907 art.
43. The positive duties on the occupant are even more pronounced under the IV Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949. On these
obligations see EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 104-06 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1993).
36. On this distinction between the types of obligations, see Eyal Benvenisti Human Dignity in
Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81 (2006).
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required to conduct a transparent and accountable investigation after the
use of force.
A case in point concerns the dispute about targeted killing. This policy
treats individuals as military targets per se, given the paucity of
conventional non-human military targets of an irregular fighting force. The
LOAC camp argues that armies that target individual combatants regard
them as legitimate targets in war, as there is no distinction between human
and non-human military targets. But the alternative view is sensitive to the
fact that the laws regarded the killing of combatants as a legitimate means
to achieve military goals, rather than a goal in and of itself. As the 1868 St.
Petersburg Declaration envisioned, war was not about killing combatants;
wars were understood to be fought to achieve non-human military goals
and fighting was to be conducted against an abstract, collective enemy.37
Therefore, it was possible to stipulate that “the only legitimate object which
States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military
forces of the enemy; That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the
greatest possible number of men.”38 Although war always involved the
killing of combatants, killing the adversary was never the goal. Applying
this logic to the effort to preempt individuals from engaging in an attack
would require a consideration of whether it is possible to disable rather
than kill them. This explains why the IHL camp insists on pausing to
consider alternatives to targeted killing;39 something that is viewed by the
LOAC camp as injecting irrelevant requirements of human rights law into
jus in bello analysis.
The tension between governments engaged in transnational warfare
and third parties can therefore not be starker: whereas governments seek to
deny or dilute the applicability of conventional warfare obligations to
transnational asymmetric conflicts, third parties insist on their applicability
and lean toward imposing even more stringent constraints, which
governments regard as impermissibly endangering their troops and
irresponsibly immunizing non-state fighters. Only time can tell if and how
this tension can be resolved.

37. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 10.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. See Israeli Targeted Killing judgment, Public Committee against Torture, supra note 33, para.
40; ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 1043-44 (2008) [hereinafter ICRC
guidelines].
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C. Implementation: Reviewing Military Discretion
The growing involvement of third parties in the monitoring and
assessment of military decisions raises a third challenge to the legal
regulation of warfare: how to regulate the exercise of discretion by the
military commander. Because many of the obligations in warfare are based
on standards that call for balancing conflicting interests, regulating the
commander’s exercise of discretion raises two questions: what weight the
commander is expected to assign to the conflicting interests and what
should be the standard of review of her decisions. Answering these
questions was not a stark challenge in conventional, symmetric warfare
because the parties to such conflict were presumed to promote their selfinterests and were not expected to positively protect (to ensure) enemy
civilians. The question was also moot in many asymmetric conflicts due to
the lack of information which precluded third parties from effectively
assessing many such decisions. But with the growing assertiveness of third
parties and increasing availability of ample and precise information, the
time to answer these questions has finally arrived.
Take, for example, military decisions made by the commanding
officer of an UAV unit whose drones hover above Gaza, Yemen,
Afghanistan, or Pakistan looking for irregular combatants, their human
prey. The unit identifies a person who it regards as a particularly dangerous
combatant. This person is resting at his home, together with his family
members who are known to be non-combatants. Recently developed
computer programs40 can help the UAV operators to accurately foresee
how many of the family members would be killed together with the person
that they wish to kill. Using these programs the operators select a method
of attack which due to its specific direction and the weapon to be used
would minimize but not eliminate the collateral harm. The commander can
now reliably project how many family members will also be killed in the
attack. Jack Beard points out that in such situations “civilian deaths . . .
may be incidental but no longer . . . accidental.”41 Unfortunately for the
individual operators, the same information technology that improves their
effectiveness by clarifying the factual situation on the ground also increases
their personal responsibility and brings them dangerously close to a
criminal mens rea: with the fog of the battle removed, they might not be
40. Computer software can give an exact estimation of the collateral damage induced by an attack.
An algorithm, used specifically with Predator drones, assigns different weights to each of the potential
victims and to the collateral damage. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26,
2009, at 36; David Anthony Denny, U.S. Air Force Uses New Tools to Minimize Civilian Casualties,
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2003/March/20030318185619ynnedd0.3604242.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2010).
41. Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L. L. 409, 438-39 (2009).
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able to defend themselves by arguing that they did not know what would be
the result of the strike.42
But will such an attack be considered “clearly excessive” (for criminal
liability purposes) or simply “excessive” (for incurring state
responsibility)? In most cases, no law could give a strict a priori “yes” or
“no” answer to this question without considering the specific circumstances
and no judge, or even military advisor, could reasonably condone any
course of action in advance.43 Instead the law relies on standards like
“proportionality” or the “reasonable military commander,” and waits for
ex-post review of the decisions made.44 The law can structure the decisionmaking process by stipulating procedural steps that could eliminate
miscalculations or expose the recklessness of the operator,45 but it does not
necessarily make the decision any easier. The requirement to weigh
42. According to the Elements of Crime under the ICC Statute, for criminal responsibility one has
to prove that “the perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians . . .
and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” International Criminal Court Act 2001
(Elements of Crimes) Regulations 2004, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk
(type “International Criminal Court” into “Title” field, and “2004” into year field; then select link that
appears with full title of statute).
43. In its judgment concerning the legality of targeted killings, the Israeli Supreme Court insisted
that “[t]here is . . . no escaping examination of each and every case.” HCJ 769/02 The Public
Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel [2005], available at
elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf. The responsibility is the military
commander’s, and the court cannot decide for the commander in advance but only in retrospect.
“Having determined in this judgment the provisions of customary international law on the issue before
us, we naturally cannot examine its realization in advance. Judicial review on this issue will, by nature,
be retrospective.” Id. ¶ 59. This point is also captured by the German Constitutional Court in its 2006
judgment concerning the Aviation Security Act. While annulling legislation that authorized the
downing of hijacked planes in 9/11 scenarios, it opined that in an ex post review, in criminal trial, of a
person’s private initiative to shoot the hijacked, the decision might be assessed as justified or excused
(para. 128 ccc: “It need not be decided here how a shooting down that is performed all the same, and an
order relating to it, would have to be assessed under criminal law [...]”). [First Senate] Feb. 15, 2006
(F.R.G),
available
at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.net/entscheidungen/rs20060215
_1bvr035705en.html.
44. Referring to the principle of proportionality in warfare, the Committee Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “suggested that the
determination of relative values must be that of the ‘reasonable military commander.’” FINAL REPORT
TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, ¶ 50 (2003) [hereinafter Final Report].
45. The Israeli targeted killing judgment outlines the procedure for making decisions, namely the
need to obtain the “most thoroughly verified” information regarding the identity and activity of the
civilian, including “careful verification” in case of doubt; then assessing whether less harmful means
can be employed against the person, like arrest and trial. The attack should be followed by “a thorough
investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the
attack” by “an objective committee,” and compensation should be paid in cases of mistaken identity.
HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel [2005],
available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf.
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alternatives to a military strike46 adds more complexity to this issue
because it requires the commander (and third parties) to consider
circumstances that cannot be predicted: should the commander wait until
the enemy combatant has left the busy street, but then what if he manages
to disappear?
The recourse to standards like proportionality or reasonableness is
common in law. It makes ample sense to do so when the balancer can be
expected to act impartially. Societies have developed tools to make tragic
choices based on assumptions regarding the impartiality and skillfulness of
the decision-maker to whom society assigns such judgments.47 For
example, we acknowledge that people are more likely to die from accidents
if a governmental agency would decide to allocate more resources to
building ports than to improving the roads. What makes the assignment of
such judgment calls legitimate is the fact that the deaths are statistical
deaths; this ensures that decision-makers internalize the risks because they
may be the ones killed on the road. But this is not the case during combat,
when, for example, the operators of UAVs are called upon to weigh their
own national interests versus those of remotely situated foreigners. In such
a scenario, the assumption of impartiality is not very realistic. This
situation raises two questions: first, do these operators indeed have to give
equal weight to other-regarding considerations? Second, if the answer is
affirmative, how could the law make them do so?
Let us begin with the first, normative, question, which goes to the
heart of the balancing act that national decision-makers must perform. Do
we expect a military commander to assign similar values to its national
interest and to the interests of foreign civilians in the theater of operation?
For national governments, the task of internalizing fully other nations’ and
foreign nationals’ rights and interests, possibly without the promise of
reciprocity, is in tension with their political and social accountability.48 At
the same time, and for this very reason, other stakeholders would tend to
view such balancing acts as inherently partial and unreliable. Does, and
should, international law nevertheless impose such an obligation on the
46. See id. See also ICRC guidelines, supra note 39.
47. On the identifications of impartiality and skillfulness as conditions for assigning decisionmakers with the task of balancing among rights and interests see Eyal Benvenisti & Ariel Porat,
Implementing the Law by Impartial Agents: An Exercise in Tort Law and International Law, 6
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1 (2005) (Isr.).
48. For a recent negative answer see the decision of the German federal prosecution not to indict a
German officer for ordering an airborne attack on Taliban targets that entailed many civilian casualties:
a ground attack would have risked the German troops and international law did not require the
commander to assume such a risk. See announcement of April 19, 2010 on proceedings concerning an
aerial
attack
on
September
4,
2009
(In
German)
available
at
ttp://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?newsid=360.
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national decision-makers, namely to internalize foreign interests fully, as if
they were domestic interests, or as if the decision-maker was an agent of
humanity, expecting to protect everybody regardless of their national
affiliation without any preference given to domestic interests?
I suggest that the answer to any question of this kind must be informed
primarily by the expectations of the relevant body of norms that governs
the situation. The law of occupation, for example, expects the occupant to
act like a trustee of the population subject to its control; it may consider the
military interests of occupation forces but not those of the state to which
the occupation forces belong.49 International human rights law compels the
state authority not to discriminate on the basis of nationality; “nationalityblindness” should inform the balancing act. In contrast, it is not entirely
clear whether the law governing conventional international armed conflict
expects the “reasonable military commander” to be “nationality-blind” in
order to avoid criminal or state responsibility.50 If we accept that attacking
armies in transnational asymmetric conflicts have a “duty to ensure” the
lives of civilians in the area they attack then perhaps they are expected to
treat all civilians with similar respect (obviously, such blindness would
relate only to the human rights of the relevant civilians and not to the
national interests of the foreign state). It can be expected, however, that the
LOAC camp will resist such a conclusion, stating that there is no moral or
legal basis for the obligation to consider other-regarding considerations in
the absence of reciprocity and mutuality of obligations, when there is no
assurance that others are equally committed to act selflessly.51 There is no
doubt, therefore, that this suggested conclusion will be another point of
contention in the ensuing legal battle between regular armies engaged in
transnational armed conflicts and third parties on the future of the law.
The response to the normative question also informs the response to
the institutional question concerning the proper standard of review of
49. For criticism of the seeming impartiality of the occupant’s exercise of discretion and on the
appearance of normalcy that such an obligation bestows on what must be regarded as an exceptional
regime see Martti Koskenniemi, Occupied Zone: A Zone of Reasonableness?, 41 ISRAEL L. REV. 13
(2008); Aeyal Gross, Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the
International Law of Occupation?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2007).
50. The Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign regarded such
questions as unresolved: “a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained
and the injury to non-combatants and or the damage to civilian objects? . . . d) To what extent is a
military commander obligated to expose his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or
damage to civilian objects?” Final Report, supra note 44, ¶ 49.
51. Such an argument can be supported by the rejection of cosmopolitan justice arguments. See,
e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. PUB. AFFAIRS 113 (2005) (insisting that
the existence of global political institutions that can assure that others are equally committed, there can
be no basis to require individual actors and states to act selflessly).
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military decision-making. What deference should the reviewing institution
give to the “reasonable military commander”? In tort law, where this
standard of review is prevalent, we are usually satisfied with assigning the
domestic court, which we regard as sufficiently skillful and impartial, the
task of properly balancing conflicting interests. It is the court which will
determine whether, say, the surgeon operated reasonably or not, without
any deference to the surgeon.52 The answer is different in matters involving
the exercise of public power because many democracies believe that it is
the administrative agency, not the court, which has been assigned the
authority to exercise discretion by the legislator. Therefore, different legal
systems adopt (real or rhetorical) deferential doctrines, such as the
American Chevron doctrine,53 according to which the reviewing court must
defer to the public authority’s judgment call. What is the answer in
international law? Again I would suggest that the answer will depend on
the norms of the particular body of international law. It is possible to hold
that in the context of trade law every sovereign enjoys discretion in
forming national policies and hence external review will have to recognize
national margins of appreciation,54 whereas in other contexts—for example
jus ad bellum, or the law of occupation—no such deference is called for.55
What then should be the standard of review, under jus in bello, of a
military commander’s decision? Should the law regard the commander as a
private actor entitled to little deference, like the surgeon in domestic tort
law, or like a public authority to which deference is mandatory? So far this
question has not received systematic attention.56 The Israeli Supreme
Court, for example, wavers between two opposite positions: in several
cases it asserted its own (rather than the military commander’s) “expertise”

52. See Benvenisti & Porat, supra note 47.
53. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. Steven Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L.193, 194 (1996).
55. See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States) 2003 ICJ 90, para. 73 (“the
requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence must have been
necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no room for any ‘measure of discretion.’”);
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200 (July 9) (holding that no deference should be granted to Israeli
occupation authorities). For a different view see Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005) (Isr.) (calling for a general
doctrine allowing margin of appreciation to states, and criticizing the above-mentioned ICJ decisions).
56. In a dissenting opinion in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Judge
Shahabuddeen suggested that the “balance . . . between the degree of suffering inflicted and the military
advantage in view . . . of course . . . has to be struck by States. The Court cannot usurp their judgment.”
1996 I.C.J. 226, 402 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen); see also Shany, supra note 55, at
934-35.
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in determining the proper balance between rights versus security interests,57
but in other cases it recognized a margin of appreciation that the
commander enjoys.58 Moreover, the availability of several potential
reviewers (the commander’s national court, a foreign national court, an
international tribunal, an ad-hoc commission of inquiry) adds another
complexity: should they adopt different standards of review of the military
commander’s decision?
As already mentioned, I suggest that the answer to this question
should be informed by the normative expectations of the national decisionmaker, who in this context is the military commander. To the extent that
the normative expectation is that the commander is “nationality-blind” and
thereby assigns similar values to national and foreign interests, there should
be little support for a judicial policy of deference. Two considerations
would back this conclusion. First, the national decision-maker can be
analogized to an agent of humanity which is expected to serve
cosmopolitan values rather than pursuing its own. Second, because its
impartiality is inherently suspect when it acts as a judge in its own cause,
no deference to the national decision-maker is appropriate.59 If, however,
international law regards national agents as sovereign powers entitled to
form national policies that promote them, then national agents would be
entitled to deference, perhaps even to a Chevron-type of deference.
Therefore, the debate between the IHL and the LOAC camps on the nature
of obligations of parties engaged in transnational armed conflict shapes
also the attitude toward the “reasonable military commander” and the
proper standard of review of her decisions.
CONCLUSION
The persistence and prevalence of asymmetric transnational armed
conflicts have given rise to two rival claims. Governments involved in such
conflicts emphasize their added risks in fighting irregular combatants who
abuse legal protections. These governments seek to interpret the law in
57. H.C. 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. v. Gov’t of Israel [2004], available at
elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.pdf (“The question is whether, by legal
standards, the route of the separation fence passes the tests of proportionality. This is a legal question,
the expertise for which is held by the Court.”).
58. H.C. 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel [2005], available at
elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (“Proportionality is not a standard of
precision. At times there are a number of ways to fulfill its conditions. A zone of proportionality is
created. It is the borders of that zone that the Court guards. The decision within the borders is the
executive branch’s decision. That is its margin of appreciation.”).
59. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Values, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843 (1999) (arguing that no deference is due to national decision-makers
when the domestic democratic process is likely to disregard minority interests).
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ways that dilute their responsibilities. At the same time, however, various
third parties, including national and international courts, commissions of
inquiry, and global civil society, converge in an entirely different approach.
Informed by the expectation that with more power comes more
responsibility, these third parties expect the more powerful side to
gradually ensure enemy civilians’ lives (not only to respect their lives).
This expectation leads to demands for modification of the traditional law in
the context of transnational asymmetric warfare in at least three areas: first,
the recognition of an obligation to consider alternatives to military action
(asking not only whether targets were legitimate military targets, but also
whether the decision to use force against them rather than explore the nonforcible, or less-forcible alternatives, was justified under the
circumstances); second, if there were no available alternatives, the army
would be expected to invest significant resources to minimize harm to
civilians; and finally, following an attack, the army would be obliged to
conduct a transparent and accountable investigation to reexamine its own
actions. Third parties may also insist on limiting the discretion of the
“reasonable military commander.”
This essay sought to understand and delineate the fundamental
cleavage between the two visions. The aim was not to develop a detailed
argument in favor of one or another position, although outlines of such
arguments were offered. It is beyond the scope of this essay to assess if and
how such a cleavage between two visions of the law can be bridged and
how the law would look in the future. Much depends on the continued
ability of courts, both domestic and international, to assert positions
independent of governments and the continued commitment of global civil
society to constrain conventional armies. At present it does not seem likely
that governments will be able to avoid accountability for their conduct of
hostilities to formal or informal third parties. In an age informed by the
liberal principle that rejects collective punishment and guilt by association,
protecting non-combatants remains a common concern. Even the domestic
courts of those governments that engage in such conflicts resist the demand
to yield authority to the executive. If these attitudes persist, it can be
expected that the recourse to third parties as partners in the regulation of
transnational armed conflicts will expand.

